The effects of cyberbullying victimization on cyberbullying perpetration among Chinese college students: callous-unemotional traits and the moderating role of Internet morality.

Introduction: The Internet has triggered a series of online deviant behaviors, and cyberbullying is one of them. Cyberbullying victimization as a category of frustration and the aggression triggered by it has been confirmed by many studies. Previous studies have explored the relationship between cyberbullying victimization and cyberbullying perpetration. However, the boundary conditions of the two have yet to be sufficiently explored, and this article will further explore the moderating effect in the transformation mechanism. Methods: The convenience sampling method was used to select a cumulative total of 668 students from university students of several universities in Beijing for the study, using questionnaires including Cyberbullying Victimization Questionnaire, Cyberbullying Perpetration Questionnaire, the Callous-unemotional Traits Scale, and Internet Morality Questionnaire. Results: (1) Controlling for gender and grade, cyberbullying victimization has a positive relationship with cyberbullying perpetration. (2) Callous-unemotional traits moderated the relationship between cyberbullying victimization and perpetration. (3) Internet morality can moderate the relationship between cyberbullying victimization and perpetration. (4) Callous-unemotional traits and Internet morality can co-regulate the relationship between cyberbullying victimization and perpetration. Conclusion: The results indicate that cyberbullying victimization had a significant positive relationship with cyberbullying perpetration, a process moderated by callous-unemotional traits and Internet morality.

Measuring perceived fitness interdependence between humans and non-humans.

Conservation ethics (i.e. moral concern for non-human organisms) are widespread, but we lack a comprehensive explanation for why people care about other species at all, and why they express strong moral concern for some species but not others. Recent theory suggests that conservation ethics might be rooted in cooperation between humans and members of other species. Building on central predictions of this eco-evolutionary theory, we conducted an online study (N = 651) and exploratory factor analysis to develop two scales that independently measure perceived fitness interdependence (PFI) and conservation ethics. The PFI scale measures perceived shared fate as a proximate indicator of human fitness interdependence with non-human organisms (i.e. the degree to which humans and other organisms influence each other's evolutionary success, that is, survival and reproduction). We designed the conservation ethics scale to measure moral beliefs and attitudes regarding those organisms. Both scales are composed of two factors and demonstrate good internal reliability. By combining insights from various branches of the evolutionary human sciences, including evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology and human behavioural ecology, we offer empirical tools to investigate eco-evolutionary foundations of conservation ethics and behaviour.

Target Happiness Attenuates Perceivers' Moral Condemnation of Prejudiced People.

Five experiments (combined N = 4,915) tested the prediction that the moral boost of happiness would persist for social targets with moral failings. In Studies 1 and 2, White and Black participants, respectively, judged happy (versus unhappy) racist targets more morally good. In Study 3, happy (versus unhappy) racist targets were judged more morally good and less (more) likely to engage in racist (good) behavior. Behavioral expectations explained the link between happiness and moral evaluations. Study 4 replicated Studies 1 to 3 in the context of sexism. In Study 5, happy (versus unhappy) targets who engaged in racially biased behavior were evaluated as more morally good, and this effect was explained by behavioral forecasts. Happiness boosts attributions of moral goodness for prejudiced people and does so via expectations for future behavior. Future directions are discussed.

Perceived Power Polarizes Moral Evaluations.

We show an interactive effect of perceiver-target similarity in ideological beliefs and target power on impressions of target morality. Consistent with prior research, perceivers rated targets with dissimilar ideologies as less moral than targets with similar ideologies, but this difference in ratings was magnified for powerful targets relative to less powerful targets. We argue that these results emerged because perceivers expected similar-ideology, powerful (vs. powerless) targets to help the self more, and expected dissimilar-ideology, powerful (vs. powerless) targets to hurt the self more. We establish this effect when people evaluate politicians (Study 1), groups, and individuals (Studies 2a-2b); demonstrate its predictive power over other kinds of interpersonal similarity; and show that it affects morality judgments uniquely when compared with other consequential dimensions of social evaluation. Finally, we manipulated power experimentally and showed the interaction when the difference between high- and low-power manipulations was controlled over just $1 (Studies 3-4).

An all-embracing science: The anthropological conception of Paolo Mantegazza.

This paper deals with the anthropological conception of the first modern Italian anthropologist, Paolo Mantegazza (1831-1910). We will begin by contextualizing the status of anthropology in Italy during the second half of the 19th century. Subsequently, we will delve into some of the inspirations that led the Italians to have such a multifaceted conception of the discipline. Next, we will outline the content of this approach and clarify the meaning of "omnicomprehensive science." From there, we will come to understand the reason for the variety of interests of the anthropologist, who aimed to study the human being in all aspects of life. We will then mention the moral objective present in his professional journey: through an understanding of the complexity of human life, the anthropologist wanted to contribute to the progress and well-being of society; in other words, to "living well."

Prescription for Love: An Experimental Investigation of Laypeople's Relative Moral Disapproval of Love Drugs.

New technologies regularly bring about profound changes in our daily lives. Romantic relationships are no exception to these transformations. Some philosophers expect the emergence in the near future of love drugs: a theoretically achievable biotechnological intervention that could be designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships. We investigated laypeople's resistance to the use of such technologies and its sources. Across two studies (Study 1, French and Peruvian university students, N after exclusion = 186; Study 2, Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, N after exclusion = 693, pre-registered), we found that the use of love drugs designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships are considered as more morally problematic than psychological therapy with the same aim. In Study 2, we show that this last effect is partially due to the fact that the love resulting from the use of love drugs is perceived as less authentic, intense, and durable. We discuss the specific role of authenticity in the relative moral disapproval of love drugs.

System circumvention: Dishonest-illegal transgressions are perceived as justified in non-meritocratic societies.

Does believing that "effort doesn't pay" in society shape how people view dishonest-illegal transgressions? Across five studies, we show that when people view societal success as non-meritocratic-that is, more dependent on luck and circumstances than on hard work-they are more lenient in their moral judgements of dishonest-illegal transgressions. Perceiving society as non-meritocratic predicted greater justifiability of dishonest-illegal transgressions in the United States (Study 2), and across 42 countries (N = 49,574; Study 1). And inducing participants to view society as non-meritocratic increased justifiability of others' dishonest-illegal transgressions, via greater feelings of sympathy (Studies 3 and 4). Next, we investigated the contours of these effects. Perceiving societal success as non-meritocratic rather than based on hard work causes people to view dishonest-illegal transgressions as more justifiable if they are perpetrated by the poor, but not the rich (Study 4), and if the dishonest-illegal transgressions are related to economic striving, such as money laundering and dealing illegal drugs (Study 5). In sum, when people see a social system as unfair, they show greater tolerance for dishonest-illegal transgressions perpetrated to circumvent the system.

Testing Care and Morality: Everyday Testing During COVID-19 in Denmark.

COVID-testing was central to control the spread of infection in Denmark. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, we show that testing was not just a diagnostic sign; it was also a biosocial practice that enacted a public health morality, centered on responsibility, care, and belonging. We argue that testing led to a public healthicization of everyday life, as it moralized individual and collective behavior and created a moral divide between the tested and the untested. By attending to COVID-19 testing as a material-semiotic sign, we show how testing is embedded within a particular cultural and moral framework of the Danish welfare state.

James Rachels and the morality of euthanasia.

My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die.

Can an effective end-of-life intervention for advanced dementia be viewed as moral?

Many people dread prolonged dying with suffering in the terminal illness, advanced dementia. To successfully facilitate a timely dying, advance directives must be effective and acceptable. This article considers whether authorities, including treating physicians, can accept as moral, the effective intervention that ceases caregivers' assistance with oral feeding and hydrating. The article presents eight criticisms and "alternate views" regarding ceasing assisted feeding/hydrating. It draws on perspectives from clinical medicine, law, ethics, and religion. The conflict is between (A) people's core beliefs that reflect cultural norms and religious teachings regarding what is moral versus (B) patients' autonomous right of self-determination and claim right to avoid suffering. The article presents each side as strongly as possible. Accepting the intervention as moral could allow patients a peaceful and timely dying from patients' underlying disease. Confidence in future success can deter patients and their surrogates from considering a hastened dying in earlier stages of dementia.

Moral universals: A machine-reading analysis of 256 societies.

What is the cross-cultural prevalence of the seven moral values posited by the theory of "morality-as-cooperation"? Previous research, using laborious hand-coding of ethnographic accounts of ethics from 60 societies, found examples of most of the seven morals in most societies, and observed these morals with equal frequency across cultural regions. Here we replicate and extend this analysis by developing a new Morality-as-Cooperation Dictionary (MAC-D) and using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to machine-code ethnographic accounts of morality from an additional 196 societies (the entire Human Relations Area Files, or HRAF, corpus). Again, we find evidence of most of the seven morals in most societies, across all cultural regions. The new method allows us to detect minor variations in morals across region and subsistence strategy. And we successfully validate the new machine-coding against the previous hand-coding. In light of these findings, MAC-D emerges as a theoretically-motivated, comprehensive, and validated tool for machine-reading moral corpora. We conclude by discussing the limitations of the current study, as well as prospects for future research.

Impacts of Unethical Behavior on Self-Esteem: A Contingent Dual-Process Model.

Previous studies have reported mixed findings on how and why unethical behavior affects self-esteem. To address this issue, a contingent dual-process model is proposed and tested. The model postulates a negative impact of unethical behavior on self-esteem through decreased morality, a positive effect through increased competence, and the relative strength of these two paths depending on system-justifying motives. Studies using unethical behavior for self-interest (Studies 1 and 2), involving ingroup interest (Study 3), and measuring (Studies 1 and 3) and manipulating general system justification (Study 2) provide support for the model. By identifying the effects of system-justifying motives and linking the two competing paths, the model reconciles inconsistencies in previous research regarding how self-esteem is influenced by unethical behavior and reveals the underlying mechanism of this association. Accordingly, the current research constructs a motivational and superordinate framework to clarify the dynamic consequences of unethical behavior.

Procreating in an Overpopulated World: Role Moralities and a Climate Crisis.

It is an open question when procreation is justified. Antinatalists argue that bringing a new individual into the world is morally wrong, whereas pronatalists say that creating new life is morally good. In between these positions lie attempts to provide conditions for when taking an anti or pronatal stance is appropriate. This paper is concerned with developing one of these attempts, which can be called qualified pronatalism. Qualified pronatalism typically claims that while procreation can be morally permissible, there are constraints on when it is justified. These constraints often concern whether an individual is motivated to procreate for the right reasons. For instance, if someone is not sufficiently concerned with the child's future welfare, the qualified pronatalist will say that procreation is not justified. Moreover, David Wasserman says that this concern forms a role-based duty. That is, prospective parents have special duties to be concerned for the child's future welfare by virtue of the role they occupy. In this paper, I argue that a proper examination of a prospective parent's role-based duties entails that more is needed to justify procreation. Bringing a new person into the world leaves fewer resources for people who already need them, and the current size of the human population is unsustainable from a planetary point of view. Therefore, even if there is nothing wrong with procreation per se, the external condition of overpopulation, and its ensuing public health issues, plausibly gives rise to a role-based duty that prospective parents must account for when deciding whether to procreate.

Understanding moral distress in home-care nursing: An interview study.

BACKGROUND: Moral distress is a far-reaching problem for nurses in different settings as it threatens their health. AIM: This study examined which situations lead to moral distress in home-care nursing, how and with which consequences home-care nurses experience moral distress, and how they cope with morally stressful situations and the resulting moral distress. RESEARCH DESIGN: A qualitative interview study with reflexive thematic analysis was used. PARTICIPANTS AND RESEARCH CONTEXT: We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 home-care nurses in Germany. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: The study was approved by the Data Protection Office and Ethics Committee of the German Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. FINDINGS: Twenty (14 female and 6 male) home-care nurses were interviewed between April and August 2023 at their chosen location. The situations leading to moral distress were inadequate care of the person in need of care, not being able to protect one's health, extended responsibility for the entire care arrangement, work-privacy conflicts, and conflicts between the understanding of care or professional ethics and the performance and billing system. The nurses experienced moral distress as they worked alone and provided care in the patient's territory. Short- and long-term strains with destructive cognitions, negative emotions, physical symptoms, and health consequences were reported. They faced challenges in coping with moral distress on institutional and individual levels. CONCLUSIONS: In cases of tension between the service and billing system and the understanding of these nurses' care services, moral distress is unavoidable. Alternative forms of organization and billing modalities, such as payment by time and the expansion and refinancing of service, should be implemented. The latter relates to systematic case and ethics meetings. Further, a transfer of medical activities, such as the prescription of wound material to registered nurses, could prevent morally stressful situations and improve patients' quality of care.

Why moral psychology needs personality psychology.

People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.

Surveying the Moral Landscape: How Ethical Frameworks Influence the Structure of Return-to-Sport Decision Making.

SYNOPSIS: Similar to all areas of health care, sports medicine has ethical considerations when making decisions-return to sport being one. Despite a general consensus on criteria to determine when an athlete is ready to return to sport, there are various scenarios that clinicians encounter that may not fall into a clear "yes" or "no" decision. These scenarios leave the clinician asking what is the "right" decision in a given circumstance? A line of questioning that invokes a moral dimension in supporting athletes when they are returning to sport. To address the moral aspect of a clinical decision, ethical frameworks and theories can guide decisions and resolve ethical dilemmas. The aim of this Viewpoint is to briefly describe 4 ethical frameworks and explore how they might apply in a clinical scenario to guide different ethical analyses and influence the final decision. J Orthop Sports Phys Ther 2024;54(4):1-4. Epub 14 February 2024. doi:10.2519/jospt.2024.12310.

"It's Not Literally True, But You Get the Gist:" How nuanced understandings of truth encourage people to condone and spread misinformation.

People have a more-nuanced view of misinformation than the binary distinction between "fake news" and "real news" implies. We distinguish between the truth of a statement's verbatim details (i.e., the specific, literal information) and its gist (i.e., the general, overarching meaning), and suggest that people tolerate and intentionally spread misinformation in part because they believe its gist. That is, even when they recognize a claim as literally false, they may judge it as morally acceptable to spread because they believe it is true "in spirit." Prior knowledge, partisanship, and imagination increase belief in the gist. We argue that partisan conflict about the morality of spreading misinformation hinges on disagreements not only about facts but also about gists.

Humor and morality in organizations.

Successful leaders often use humor to motivate, inspire, and lead. Yet, recent research suggests that the use of humor is risky for leaders. Our review suggests that humor must be morally offensive to some people for it to be perceived as funny. This inherent tension between humor and morality implies that the use of humor can sometimes act as a signal of acceptable moral standards in organizations, where a leader's use of humor carries significant risks because of the norm-violating message it sends to subordinates, or it can even be dangerous in extreme cases. We conclude the paper by offering future research directions on the study of workplace humor.

Beneficial effects of communicating intentions when delivering moral criticism: Cognitive and neural responses.

People often do not accept criticism on their morality, especially when delivered by outgroup members. In two preregistered studies, we investigated whether people become more receptive to such negative feedback when feedback senders communicate their intention to help. Participants received negative feedback from ostensible others on their selfish (rather than altruistic) decisions in a donation task. We manipulated the identity of a feedback sender (ingroup vs. outgroup) and the intention that they provided for giving feedback. A sender either did not communicate any intentions, indicated the intention to help the feedback receiver improve, or communicated the intention to show moral superiority. We measured participants' self-reported responses to the feedback (Study 1, N = 44) and additionally recorded an EEG in Study 2 (N = 34). Results showed that when no intentions were communicated, participants assumed worse intentions from outgroup senders than ingroup senders (Study 1). However, group membership had no significant effect once feedback senders made their intentions explicit. Moreover, across studies, when feedback senders communicated their intention to help, participants perceived feedback as less unfair compared with when senders tried to convey their moral superiority. Complementing these results, exploratory event-related potential results of Study 2 suggested that communicating the intention to help reduced participants' attentional vigilance toward negative feedback messages on their morality (i.e., decreased P200 amplitudes). These results demonstrate the beneficial effects of communicating the intention to help when one tries to encourage others' moral growth through criticism.

A Scalar Approach to Vaccination Ethics.

Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground-and limit-the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we develop a scalar approach according to which people can have stronger or weaker moral reasons to get vaccinated in view of the moral good of vaccination. One advantage of our approach is that it can capture why a person might have strong moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine A, but only weak moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine B. We discuss theoretical strengths of our approach and provide a case study of vaccination against COVID-19 to demonstrate its practical significance.